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THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: A PERSPECTIVE
By JA s 0. MoNROE, JR.*
I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye
may be -mistaken.-Cromwell.
The Supreme Court of the United States and its decisions under Chief
Justice Earl Warren have been the subject of extensive criticism. While
the body of criticism began shortly after the school segregation cases of
1954, it became more articulate, scholarly, and "respectable" after 1957
and has continued into 1960. It is time now that we try to see it in proper
perspective.
The public and the legal and scholarly professions must view the
criticism of the Court as involving most startling accusations.
One way to achieve perspective-to evaluate the charges, the accused,
the accusers, and the defense-is to treat the matter as one of allegations
and evidence, with the readers as jurymen. Other ways may be better, but
in the court of public opinion, the allegations have been made: let them
so be examined.
L The Main Alleged Offenses
Tabulated below are the cases' most prominently or critically discussed
in the criticism of 1958-59. For each is given the style, the issue, the gov-
ernment involved (S-state or F-Federal), the type of case (civil or
criminal), the gist of the holding (all too briefly but stripped of connota-
tions), the basis relied on for decision (Roman numerals referring to con-
stitutional amendments, "stat" meaning a statute, "proc" meaning pro-
cedure, "evid" meaning evidence), and the last three columns checking
whether or not the case was mentioned respectively in three important
documents: ACC-the 1958 report of the Anti-Communist Committee of
the American Bar Association; CJR-the 1958 (State) Chief Justices
Report; and BRC-the 1959 (A.B.A.) Bill of Rights Committee Report.
These are the cases on which the current criticism was put forward.
* Circuit Judge, Illinois Circuit Judge; A.B. 1939, LL.B. 1942, Univ. Ill. Thanks for aid in
research are due J. F Schlafly of the Illinois bar; Harold Meek (of the Missouri bar), news
editor, Irving Dilliard, former editorial editor, and the reference library staff, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch; and Dean Russell N. Sullivan, Bernita Davies, Pauline Carleton, and Dorothy Foulk,
law librarians, Marian Martin, assistant to the dean (all of the College of Law), Professors
Jack Peltason and Charles Hagan, of the political science department, and Sharon Rosenholtz,
student, all at the Umversity of Illinois. But all opinions expressed are the writer's, with which
any of them may or may not agree.
I Quoted by Dilliard, in Introduction to LEARNED EUM, TEE spmrr or LMERxxry, xxiv (1952).
2 Footnote 2 on page 372.
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H. The Allegations
Reaction to these decisions was vigorous in three fields.
1. Segregation3 In the year between the Court's historic decision
(May 17, 1954) and its final decree (May 31, 1955), the South's best
legal talent prepared to evade, stall and fight. Timing considerations, once
considered a gradualist approach to ultimate desegregation, "now appeared
but a calculated effort to convince the nation that the Supreme Court
decision cannot be enforced."14 White "citizens councils," given color of
authority by a "Southern Manifesto," led a movement of massive resist-
ance, and violence flared. Discriminatory assignments, spurious closing or
abolition of public schools forebode a decade of prolific litigation testing
such evasions. School children of both races were innocent victims of the
new tragic era.
At least 89 review articles on the subject appeared in the three years
following Brown. Questions involving the whole concept of judicial review,
the wisdom and morality of the decision, the Court's authority to rule as it
Reference on p. 369.
2 For brevity, these cases are hereinafter cited by short style only, with volume-page
citations given only once, here, in the table order, as follows:
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), reh. den. 351 U.S. 934 (1956).
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), which rose earlier, 354 U.S. 929 (1957).
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Eskridge v. Washington Board of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
Sacher v. U.S., 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
Flaxer v. U.S., 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
Yates v. U.S., 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (called Yates2 ) ; and Yates v. U.S., 356 U.S. 363 (1958)
(called Yates3 ).
Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
Witkovich v. U.S., 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
8 The legal and social reactions are summarized by the author in a book review of Angle,
Created Equal, The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, 34 N.Y. UNIv. L. Rv. 807,
813-15 (1959).
4 Roww, Go SoUTH To Soow 213 (1957).
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did, and the "unconstitutionality" of the ruling ran through a Southern
symposium on the subject.5 While the law review material was at least
scholarly (some thorough, brilliant and impartial)6 much of the criticism
was quite undocumented. The Augusta, Ga., Courier called the Justices
"nine crazy men.., dangerous tyrants,"7 and an Arizona Supreme Court
judge said he viewed the present court as "a greater danger to our demo-
cratic form of government and the American way of life than all forces
aligned against us outside our boundaries."" The body of opinion described
and samples quoted indicate the extent and variety of the criticism.
2. State-Federal relations. The State Chief Justices' Conference Com-
mittee report of August, 1958, led the criticism in this field. It mentioned9 a
"new need to urge" "judicial self-restraint" and, except for recognizing
the court's recent more liberal view as to the validity of state taxation,
found that "need" in state-federal relation cases as follows: "State anti-
subversive acts have been practically eliminated by... Nelson."'01 "Restric-
tive action under the fourteenth amendment is to be found in Sweezy .... I'l
"Konigsberg ... seems to us to reach the high water mark... in overthrow-
ing the action of a state and in denying to a state the power to keep order in
its own house."'" In Moore, "the majority opinion does not seem to have
given any consideration whatsoever to the difficulties of proof which the
state might encounter after the lapse of many years or the risks to society
which might result from the release of a prisoner of this type, if the new
prosecution should fail."' 3 Griffin involved "practical problems ... almost
unlimited ... [] a vast increase in criminal appeals and a huge case load
for appellate courts... [:] not a reassuring prospect."' Concluding, the
report said: 15
5 See Symposium issue, 4 So. Tax LJ. (Spring 1959). For a more extreme view see
Grant, quoted in Carter, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court of the United States? 19 LAw.
Guxinn Rzy. 1, 4 (Spring, 1959).
6 E.g., Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L. REV. 377
(1954), all but predicting the decision.
7 Augusta (Ga.) Courier, Oct. 13, 1958, quoted in Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, 31
N.Y. STATF. BA BuzU. 66, 67 (Feb. 1959).
s Quoted by Cohn and Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions,
28 Foanxqa. L. REv. 233, 284 (Summer 1959).
9 Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government reprint, p. 9. The report was first
issued in mimeographed form. See versions of the text in 104 CoNG. Rac. A 7782, daffy ed.,
Aug. 25, 1958; and Los Angeles Daily journal, Aug. 21-22, 1958. For an itemized critique in
a more available source, see O'Reilly, The Spencer Roanes of 1958, 4 V=ri. L. REv. 92 (Fall
1958). There appears to have been no wide publication of the State Chief justices Conference
itself.
1l Id. at 16.
11 1 d.at 16.
12 1d.at 19.
s3 Id.at 27.
14 Id. at 29.
15Id. at 34.
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We believe that in the fields with which we are concerned, and as to which
we feel entitled to speak, the Supreme Court too often has tended to adopt
the role of policy-maker without proper judicial restraint.
With chief justices from California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Hawaii opposed, those from
Nevada and North Dakota taking no part, and Connecticut, Indiana and
Arkansas not represented, the committee report was adopted, 36-8.1"
3. Civil liberties (subversion): The chief items here are the American
Bar Association Committee Report 17 on communist tactics and strategy
and the action of the Association's House of Delegates. 8
The committee listed eleven current communist tactics, four "fallacies"
regarding communism, and quoted J. Edgar Hoover's recital of warning
against "an unfortunate trend of judicial decisions ... which strain and
stretch to give the guilty not the same but vastly more protection than the
law-abiding citizen."
It urged consideration of legislation or judicial construction on ten
points involved in the cases:'" 1) to let (congressional) investigators judge
the pertinency of their own questions (Watkins, Sacker, cf. Sweezy,
Raley); 2) to allow investigation of subversives as freely as of businessmen
and labor leaders (ibid); 3) to let states enforce anti-subversive laws
(Nelson); 4) to punish teaching or advocating violent overthrow of the
government-evidently even though "divorced from action" to that end
(Yates); 5) to punish current communist organizational activity, instead
of (as under Yates) defining "organize" to mean the original 1945 party
organization; 6) to permit dismissal of subversives from nonsensitive
positions (Cole); 7) to permit discharge of public employees for refusal
to testify regarding communism (Slochower); 8) to permit wide question-
ing of aliens awaiting deportation (Witkovich), and deportation of aliens
for Communist party membership after a prior entry (Bonetti); 9) to per-
mit denial of passports for refusal to sign a non-communist affidavit; and
10) to let states bar persons from law practice on the basis of past Com-
munist party membership (Schware) or refusal to testify regarding com-
munist activity (Konigsberg).
After some debate but little modification, the A.B.A. House of Dele-
gates at its 1959 mid-term meeting (acting on the Committee Report)
passed five resolutions:2" 1) that the A.B.A. disapprove proposals to limit
any jurisdiction vested in the Court; 2) that investigating committee
16 Id. at preface.
17 104 CoNG. Rac. 19132-39 (1958) (remarks of Senator Bridges).
18 45 A.B.A.J. 360, 365 et seq. (April 1959).
19 104 CONG. REc., op. cit. supra note 17, at 19137.
20 45 A.B.A.J. 360, 406-411 (April 1959).
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purposes and powers be clearly defined (Watkins); 3) that witnesses be
given in writing the precise terms of the investigating committee authority
(ibid); 4) that whereas recent security decisions "have been severely
criticized and deemed unsound by many responsible authorities," legisla-
tion be promptly enacted to:
a. Redefine "organize" to include current recruiting, regrouping and
expansion of the Communist party (Yates).
b. Allow conviction for advocacy of violent overthrow of government or
teaching its desirability or necessity (so that) "the nation need not be
forced to delay the invoking of the judicial process until such time as the
resulting damage has already been wrought" (citing Yates); i.e., such
teaching or advocating, divorced from action, should be made criminal.
c. Permit as a condition of government employment that the employee
not refuse to answer an authorized agency regarding subversive activities
or other loyalty matters (Cole).
d. Allow deportation for Communist party membership at any time
after (any) entry (Bonetti) and wide questioning of aliens awaiting depor-
tation (Witkovicz).
e. Require labeling of political propaganda here by agents outside the
country.
The last resolution was a commendation for congressional security
committees.
The temper and view of the A.B.A. leaders were found in the debate.
"Decisions of the courts should be subjected constantly to professional
criticism.... [T]he weapon of professional criticism is the biggest weapon
we have to keep that Court... within the proper course of constitutional
government."'" "We owe it as a duty and responsibility of our high offices
as officers of the court not to criticize the court, necessarily, but to criticize
decisions that any youngster in law school knows are wrong."' "Isn't it
time that we ask the Court to read the law and interpret the law and quit
writing ideological opinions?"2 3
Roy Cohn (one of the late Senator McCarthy's associates) and Thomas
Bolan supplied a scholarly background' to give the A.B.A. criticisms
credibility.
Criticism more general (though some mentioned or apparently referred
to the three fields) was plentiful, coming mostly from the political right.
Senator Eastland 5 scaled the justices on 15 years' decisions for what
2 Id. at 408.
22 1d. at 406.
23Ibid.
2A The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions, 28 Fowmmr L. RFv. 233
(Summer 1959).
25 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 23, 1958, editorial.
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he called "the apparent fondness of the Supreme Court majority for the
communist cause." Senator Bricker"6 said the Justices had a "lust for
power" delegated to other branches of government. Senator McClelland'T
accused the court of an "instability" that "threatens the very foundations
of our republic;" certain decisions, he said, "have usurped the legislative
power of Congress, and favored communist and criminal elements."
Representative Mason28 said the Court "casts aside" cherished prece-
dents and "brazenly" substitutes "Socialist doctrines." Representative
Brooks' proposed abolishing the Court and setting up a 17-man tribunal
of state judges.
The Roman Catholic American hierarchy" observed that "traditional
sanctions of our law, life and government are challenged by a judicial
propensity which deserves the careful thought and study of lawyers and
people .... We therefore hope and pray that.., novel [interpretations]
... adopted by the Supreme Court will in due process be revised." An
American Legion national commander accused the Court of "hamstringing"
both federal and state governments in the fight against communism.3
One book, splattering critical buckshot all over the field and showing a
fine concern over Chief Justice Warren's chocolate brown suit (worn at
London when presumably formal attire was in order), was called Nine Men
Against America 3 -- including apparently even the dissenters in any cases
involved.
The A.B.A. President could quibble about whether his group had
"attacked" or "maligned" the Court. But they had certainly become chief
counsel or complaining witnesses before the court of public opinion in a
case of serious charges against the Court on all three counts mentioned here.
The remedy suggested was bills to implement the whole body of criti-
cism, and these were many.33 They included constitutional amendatory,
statutory, or resolution proposals:
1. To alter the Constitution itself, by redefining treason, and by fixed
rules of interpretation for state and federal legislation.
2. To affect the Court-to limit its appellate jurisdiction; to give such
26 Id., Sep. 17, 1958, p. 22a.
27 Id., Mar. 10, 1959, p. 9a; Mar. 14, 1959, editorial.
28 Id., Feb. 1, 1959, editorial.
29 Id., July. 6, 1959, p. 7a.
3 0 Quoted in Cohn and Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions,
28 FoRDHA: L. Rav. 233, 286 (Summer 1959).
81 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 27, 1959, p. 4a.
3 2 GoRaoN, Nini Man AG.sNsT AmmCA (1958).
83 They are listed by Freeman in Appendix B, Civil Liberties and You-the 1959 Test of
American Democracy, 10 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1, 20 (Fall, 1958) ; and discussed by Elliott in Court
Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 NoTRE DAaE LAW. 597 (Aug. 1958).
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jurisdiction in some fields to the Senate; to provide for popular election of
federal judges; to provide for their appointment by the highest state court
judges; to provide for Supreme Court justices fixed terms of office; and to
prevent them from running for President or Vice-President.
3. To alter substantive law-redefining "organize" and types of advo-
cacy of overthrow of the government as they affected communist teaching;
reciting Congressional intent to deal "effectively" with the communist con-
spiracy; refusal of passports on the basis of beliefs, associations, or dis-
ciplines; and dismissal on security grounds from government jobs in even
non-sensitive employment.
4. To affect the federal system-providing concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction regarding subversion; giving state courts control over sub-
version; prohibiting federal courts from considering state administration
of educational systems; and preventing federal interference with the states
regarding health, morals, education, transportation, and elections.
5. To modify procedure--overruling the Jencks case, making confes-
sions admissible though the accused had been held incommunicado and
not taken before a hearing court or magistrate, and making other evidence
such as wire-tapping admissible.
In all there were more than 70 such proposals in a short period.
Il. The Defense
Friends of the Court filed answers and briefs, in all three fields.
1. Segregation. To answer the Southern Manifesto came more than
100 leaders of the American bar, who declared that the then recent attacks
on the Court were "so reckless in their abuse, so heedless of the value of
judicial review, and so dangerous in fomenting disrespect for our highest
law that they deserve to be repudiated by the legal profession and by every
thoughtful citizen." 4 They pointed out that the Brown case was not
usurpation on a fourteenth amendment not mentioning schools nor imple-
mented by Congress, but was based on the general requirements of the equal
protection clause which had to be resolved by the Court; the school decisions
were part of an accepted trend, they said, made with utmost deliberation
and with generous allowance for local adjustment, there to be "complied
with in good faith."3
The problems of resistance, violence, and discriminatory devices are
part of the current scene, but seem, perhaps, to be working out all too
slowly and gradually.
Timing of the August, 1958, criticisms was noted as unique. On call in
34 Statement of bar leaders, spokesman George Wharton Pepper, 42 A.B.A.J. 1128 (Dec.
1956).
85 Id. at 1142.
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Congress the week of August 18 was a "states rights" bill, regarded as a
broad attempt to cripple the CourtY6 (Gov. Orval Faubus, leader of the
"resistance" to desegregation, was facing his second school-opening crisis
in Little Rock.) On August 20,11 too soon for inclusion or even considera-
tion of background papers by a professional staff,38 the State Chief Justices'
conference report was made public. The next day, the A.B.A. Anti-
Communist Committee Report3 9 was released and was read into the Con-
gressional Record August 22. That was the week of critical Senate debate
on the "states rights" bill.40 That same week Gov. Faubus used the Chief
Justices' report in addressing a special session of the Arkansas Legislature."1
Why was the State Chief Justices' Report so handled, asked Professor
Alexander Bickel of Yale:4  "Assuming that the Chief Justices had some-
thing intellectually coherent to say, and that it was their place to say it,
why just now? Why in August, 1958?" Dean Griswold of Harvard Law
School, in an address entitled "Fools Rush In," declared, "I am sorry it was
issued when it was-just at the time of the latest Little Rock developments
-and that it was thought wise to put it out as a sort of an encyclical." 8
Paul Freund of Harvard said precisely why:44 The "storm" over the
Court "springs, of course, mainly from the decisions in the school segre-
gation cases"; the cases actually cited by the critics were, in comparison
to the segregation decisions, "as popguns to the crack of doom"; and the
school cases (not mentioned) were "the precipitating cause of these current
onslaughts." California Justice Carter summed up:4" "Running through
this report is an obvious resentment against the Supreme Court for its
decisions in the segregation cases." And though voiced by the State Chief
Justices, the current anti-Supreme Court agitation stemmed, it was said,4
from the dixiecrats' dislike for Brown.
2. State-Federal relations. Answering the State Chief Justices' Report
directly were the dissenters of their own group. Joseph Weintraub (N.J.) :47
it was "unfortunate" that the prestige of their body was placed behind "so
36 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1958, p. lb.
37 Id., Aug. 23, 1958, p. la.
38 Chief Justices Report, Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government reprint, p. 3.
39 104 CoNo. REc., op. cit. supra note 17, date shown at 19132.
40 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1958, p. lb.
41 Quoted by Weissman, Report of the Committee of the Conference of the State Chief
Justices, 19 LAW. GUvnD REV. 6, 7 (Spring 1959).
42 Id. at 11.
4B Ibid.
44 Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L. REv. 345 (July 1958).
45 What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court of the United States? 19 LAw. GUD REv. 1, 4
(Spring, 1959).
46 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 27, 1958, editorial.
47 Id., Aug. 23, 1958, p. 4c.
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serious an indictment." Francis B. Condon (R.I.) :48 the judges' conference
was consultative,"not an organization to sit in judgment on the highest
court in the land." Charles Alvin Jones (Pa.) : "these strictures ... are
entirely uncalled for and certainly are not justified on the basis of the
decisions, which the report cites for criticism."
Dean William B. Lockhart of the University of Minnesota Law School8
called the report an "indictment... not justified," which, he said, "coming
from a responsible source like the Conference of Chief Justices, tends
among the uninformed to be taken as proof of guilt, and becomes among
the irresponsible a valuable weapon in their arsenal"; the Court has actually
"given greater effect, not less effect, to state power during the last 20 years
... [and] cannot justly be accused of lack of proper judicial restraint or a
tendency to overextend federal power in disregard of state interests." If
federal power had been increased, it was made clear51 that "the states, the
White House and Congress all have been parties" to the trend, and "it is
silly to blame the Supreme Court."
Of 351 Federal district and appeal judges polled 52 on their view of the
State Chief Justices' conclusions, only 128 (36%) responded: 59 agreed,
50 disagreed, and 19 expressed no view; 223 (64%) did not respond. While
a critical analysis showed 59/109 as agreement by 54% of those giving any
opinion, a figure just as valid would be that only 59/351 of those polled,
only 17%, would express agreement, even anonymously.
3. Civil liberties (subversion): Two committees of standing answered
the A.B.A. Anti-Communist report and the A.B.A. resolutions. The New
York City Bar Committee on Federal Legislation said53 the resolutions had
caused "concern and confusion." The A.B.A.'s own Bill of Rights Com-
mittee issued a 10,000-word report, analyzing the cases involved as not at
all untoward, and stating5' that "on balance, this committee is unable to
see any indication that the security of the nation or of the states has been
impaired by the Supreme Court."
There were strong individual dissenters in the A.B.A. House of Dele-
gates; among them two former State bar presidents and an eminent Ameri-
can bar leader. 55
48 Ibid.
49 U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 24, 1958, p. 113.
50 Does the United States Supreme Court Now Lack Appropriate Judicial Restramnt?
27 H iEpNN LAW. 83 (March 1959).
51 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 27, 1958, editorial.
52 U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 24, 1958, pp. 36-37.
53 Quoted by Come M BonA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 235.
54 Committee draft, p. 30. After disparaging comments by four past presidents of the Asso-
ciation, its House of Delegates voted to "receive" the report and to instruct the President to
reiterate the House's position of February, 1959, see notes 20-23 supra. 45 A.B.A.J. 1102 (1959).
55 See debate, 45 A.B A.J. 360, 406-410 (April 1959).
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Warren Olney III, director of the administrative office of the United
States Courts, resigned from the A.B.A. saying" that the delegates' action
was "so discreditable" that he did "not want to be identified with the
organization any longer."
The Executive Board of the A.B.A.'s rival, the National Lawyers'
Guild, recognized the right to criticize but took issue squarely:57
The recent attack.. . in which the A.B.A. has now joined transcends
the bounds of mere criticism. It constitutes a grave threat to the civil rights
and liberties of the people. It is marked by an alliance between opponents
of civil liberties and of [sic] the segregationist critics of the court.
... [The Association] relied on bare unproven assertions which have
been the commonplace of the most outspoken opponents of civil liberties,
who have used their equation of communists with danger to the internal
security as a cloak for a major attack on the Bill of Rights.
The A.B.A. made no attempt to justify its reliance on this equation,
nor did it make any attempt to analyze the decisions of the Court in terms
of legal soundness, the requirements of the Constitution or their social wis-
dom. It did not demonstrate the manner in which these decisions purport
to weaken internal security. It did not even attempt to establish the
existence of any danger to internal security which the Recommendations
are allegedly designed to prevent.
... When such strong forces seek a reversion to McCarthyism,... a
special responsibility is placed upon the lawyers of this country.. . to make
sure that the people of the country are not misled by rabble-rousers.
Itemizing, the Guild covered the issues. Re Nelson:58 "It is not in the
interest of the federal security to give politicians in thousands of counties
the opportunity to restrict the civil liberties and political freedoms of
people by outcries of communism." Re Yates: 59
The A.B.A.'s proposal adds to the existing confusion and disregard of
First Amendment values. The plain effect of the A.B.A. recommendations
is to remove the Smith Act from even the limited application of First
Amendment requirements by which the statute was construed in Yates as
well as in Dennis .... The statute proposed by the A.B.A. is uncon-
stitutional.
Re Cole"0 (cf. Service): "There is no evidence of disloyalty by government
employees which makes legislation necessary. Nor would the proposed law
make for more loyalty. What it does is to deprive government employees
of the Constitutional rights which their fellow citizens possess... " Re the
investigation cases (Watkins, Sacker, cf. Sweezy, Raley) : "It is a viola-
56 N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1959, p. 17, col. 3.
57 Report of Executive Board, 19 LAW. GunLD REv. 30 (Spring 1959).
58 Id. at 31.
59 Id. at 32.
6 0 Id. at 32.
61 Id. at 34.
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tion of the Constitution to permit any committee to invade-the freedom of
speech and press, and the privacy of ideas and opinions. No amount of
rewriting can alter that defect if the Committee-or any new committee,
such as Recommendation IV... proposes-is empowered to inquire into
witnesses' politics, political opinions or political associations. No legislative
purpose can be served by such a committee or such investigations, since
that is an area outside the domain of government." On the passport regula-
tions6 the Guild declared, "a year has passed and the results do not indi-
cate any need for legislation to reestablish the former restraints." Re
Bonetti:3 "To deport persons for nothing more than their political belief
is itself contrary to the spirit of the Bill of Rights.... If [aliens'] activities
are criminal, let them be prosecuted, but if legal they should be free to all
people." Re Witkovich:14 "reasonable and sensible." Finally, the Guild
threw the charge right back at the A.B.A. :65
Internal security is endangered, to the lasting damage of the country, when
government encroaches upon the area of the people's domain of political
opinion and association, and the A.B.A. multiplies that danger when it
permits and even encourages that invasion.
Members of the Court appeared pro se. Mr. Justice Harlan said,66
... [M]uch of the criticism has been thoughtful and worthwhile. A large
part of it, however, I am sorry to say, has been ill-informed and unworthy
on the part of some who should know better." Mr. Justice Whittaker said
criticism was bound to come from the nature of the controversies, and that
it was nothing new.67 Mr. Chief Justice Warren resigned from the A.B.A.
and was said to have begun avoiding legal groups.68 Mr. Justice Douglas
directed an article "On Misconception of the Judicial Function and the
Responsibility of the Bar:" 69
Often there are segments of society which want courts to be agencies of
retribution, not dispensers of justice. It is against these groups that the
bar must be opposed. It is to them that the bar should offer lectures and
classes on the true Americanism of our Constitution and Bill of Rights.7 0
It is the very essence of a government of laws.., that the law ... be
applied equally to all .... The provisions of our Constitution have the
6 2 Id. at 34.
63 Id.at 33.
6 4 1d. at 33.
65 Id. at 35.
66 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 26, 1958, p. 12d.
67Id., July 21, 1959, p. 12a.
68 Id., July 14, 1959, editorial section, p. 3.
6959 COL. L. REV. 227 (Feb. 1959).
70 Id. at 231
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same scope for everyone. But . . . after reading some commentators who
proclaim that at least in security cases the courts should use an abbreviated
form of due process of law, I wonder whether the hysteria of a few has not
made new demands on us.71
New demands did come from one liberal source, Professor Harrop
Freeman of Cornell University College of Law,7 who not only defended
the Court for the decisions criticized by the A.B.A. but urged that it should
go farther along libertarian lines. The remedies proposed, i.e., the bills
affecting the Court, were deplored as "a weird and indefensible result...
not to be countenanced.1 73
IV. Recess: The Plenitude and Propriety of Criticism
Before passing on the allegations or the defense, let us pause. Let us
think, and if possible think clearly-historically and logically.
Criticism of the Court has been extensive throughout its history.
In 1794 state resistance to federal court process 74 appeared when a
Georgia legislative body declared that any federal officer attempting to
execute federal court process against the state should be hanged.75 Three
early cases76 provoked proposals to impeach the judges and another pro-
posal to repeal the Circuit Court system.77 John Marshall's prestige pre-
vailed in the furor over Marbury v. Madison." But later, Justice Chase
was impeached and almost convicted; shouts of treason were heard and
various limits on the judiciary were suggested.79 During the maritime con-
troversy with England, Jefferson's embargo was made a dead letter by
state resistance, despite judicial blessing.80 For all his prestige, Marshall
backed down on a state-federal controversy over priority of Pennsylvania
and United States claims, using a technicality to dismiss the national gov-
ernment's case and leave the money with Pennsylvania."'
71 Id. at 227.
72 Civil Liberties and You-the 1959 Test of American Democracy, 10 SYRAcUSE L. Rv. 1
(Fall 1958).
73 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1959, editorial.
74 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
75 Quoted in 1 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 129 (1932).
76 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); U.S. v. Williams, Fed. Case No. 17,708 (1799);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
77 Baker, Yesterday's Critics of the Federal Judiciary, 47 ILL. BAR. J. 314, 315 (Nov.-Feb.
1958-59) (hereinafter cited as Baker). Most of his citations as to historical consequences are
from WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNI ED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1937).
78 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
79 Baker, supra note 77, at 316.
8 0 Id. at 317-20.
81 Id. at 320-21; Miller v. Nicholls, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 311 (1819) ; U.S. v. Nicholls, 4
Yeates 251 (1805). A like blow to federal prestige came with U.S. v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
115 (1809), also involving Marshall. See Baker, supra note 77, at 322.
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Federal court invalidation82 of a Georgia statute regarding legislative
land grants to speculators was called "shocking" and was said to be based
on Marshall's "personal biases.18 3 A holding" that a United States treaty
superseded a Virginia statute brought flat defiance from Virginia judges.85
The United States Supreme Court's power to review state court decisions 8
was called "a most monstrous and unexampled doctrine;" and Virginia
Judge Roane (who issued this noted statement) urged a constitutional
amendment to curb or abolish the Court.87 McCulloch v. Maryland8
brought to the Court strong censure from press, judges, legislatures, and
former President Jefferson. 89 When Kentucky land laws were invalidated,9
Henry Clay added his voice." When the United States failed to come
through on its promise to abrogate Indian titles in Georgia, and Georgia
retook the ceded land formerly given to the United States in partial return
for such a promise, an Indian's state court murder conviction on tribal
land resulted in writ of error to the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction; but the state hanged the
man anyway. Story called the action "intemperate and indecorous," but
others knew it was plain nullification.92 When Marshall issued a writ 5
ordering the release of two missionaries in the key territory, convicted for
not securing a Georgia license, President Jackson is said to have retorted:
"John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."94 Jackson,
of course, vetoed the National Bank Charter on grounds opposed to
McCulloch v. Maryland, and the country reelected himY5
Chief Justice Taney's period brought as much critcism as that during
Marshall's time. The Charles River Bridge" case was a matter of
"increased disgust" to Chancellor Kent and others.9 7 After Kendall v.
United States,98 President Van Buren asked Congress to. divest federal
82 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
83 Baker, supra note 77, at 394.
84 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranca) 602
(1813).
85 Baker, supra note 77, at 395.
86 Reasserted in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
87 Baker, supra note 77, at 396.
88 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
89 Baker, supra note 77, at 396-98.
90 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823):
9 1 Baker, supra note 77, at 399.
92 Id. at 402.
93 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832).
94 Baker, supra note 77, at 403.
05 Id. at 404.96 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 420.(1837).
97 Baker, supra note 77, at 478.
9837 U.S. (12 Peters) 524 (1838).
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courts of mandamus power. 9 A fight between a federal assignee in bank-
ruptcy and a court which attached the property sought brought another
explosive situation.100 State-federal rows over slavery and the fugitive slave
laws were many. When judicial decision' 01 made it more difficult for states
to help runaway Negroes, the states responded with personal liberty laws,
making it almost impossible to enforce the fugitive law. 2 Sumner of
Massachusetts said, "The Court cannot control our duty as to legislation.
... M0 The Dred Scott case, its precursor, and others involving escaped
negroes'0° brought repeated abuse. 10 5 The Taney Court was called "a silk
gowned fogydom, a good portion of it imbecile with age." Legislatures
declared the void and invalid character of Supreme Court mandates and
spoke of "a duty" to disregard its decisions. Political recriminations
included proposals to reorganize the Court. The Dred Scott case itself
provoked a tornado of abuse and invective,"0 6 including word that it was
the product of "five slave holders and two or three doughfaces," "a platform
of historic falsehood," a "wicked and false judgment," "assassination of a
race," the "plea of a tricky lawyer and not the decree of an upright judge."
Lincoln, debating with Douglas, said that the Court had overruled other
decisions, and that his party would "do what we can to have it overrule
this."'0 7 After the Merryman'"8 conflict with Lincoln, Taney was accused
of taking sides with traitors, and even after his death, it was said0 9 that
"his name is to be hooted down the page of history." Ex parte Milligan"'
was said to have "no moral force," and was called "a new and most mis-
chievous weapon in the hands of those who oppose the great Union
party.""' Proposals were heard to swamp the court with additional mem-
bers, to eliminate the Court itself, and to require the concurrence of eight
of the justices for certain holdings." 2
From reconstruction through the turn of the century, criticism of the
9D Baker, supra note 77, at 479.
loo Ibid.
lOlPrigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539 (1842), a remarkable preview of the
Dred Scott case, and almost as long.
102 Baker, supra note 77, at 480.
103 Ibid.
104 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857) ; Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851); "Oberlin Rescue
Cases," 9 Ohio St. 77-325 (1859).
105 Baker, supra note 77, at 480-86.
lo6 Id. at 485-86.
107 Id. at 486.
108 Ex Parte Merryman, Fed. Case No. 9487 (1861).
109 Baker, supra note 77, at 488.
110 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
111 Baker, supra note 77, at 489.
112 d. at 490.
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Court continued. The Court's rebuff of attempts to bar former rebels from
the ministry1 3 and from the practice of law"' met with proposals for court
rules to accomplish the same result.1 5 On Ex parte McCardle"6 the Court
backed down again, delaying an appeal decision until a bill to restrict the
Court's appellate jurisdiction became law."-' The revised decision in the
legal tender cases118 was said to provoke "the indignant contempt of think-
ing men"; it was called "a weak decision... almost ridiculously inconsistent
with the traditional interpretation of the constitution.""'  The revised
decision in the income tax case holding the law invalid, 2 ° was called a
"wound inflicted on the American people," a "triumph of selfishness over
patriotism," and Bryan said the Court took its stand "with the wealthy
against the poor."'' The sixteenth amendment, of course, followed.
The early twentieth century, characterized by new social and economic
legislation, brought many decisions adverse to enactments such as mini-
mum wage laws, maximum hours laws, child labor laws, and statutes
to outlaw the "yellow dog" contract and restrict injunctions against
picketing? 22 Labor and social leaders revolted against the Court and one
critic said it was exercising "political and not judicial power."'2 3 Theodore
Roosevelt called one decision124 "the most galling of tyrannies.'sas5 Senator
George Norris was an outstanding critic of the Court. 26 Congressional
veto of Court decisions, popular election, fixed terms, and a requirement of
a two-thirds Court vote to invalidate congressional acts were among the
suggested remedies.1 7
113 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
114Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
"1 Baker, supra note 77, at 491.
116 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
117 Baker, supra note 77, at 492.
118 Knox v. Lee, and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). The first ruling was
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). Between the two decisions, one new
justice replaced a retiring member, and one new judgeship was created; so there were two new
members of the Court. If the appointing President knew in advance how the new justices would
decide, this is the first noted instance of court "packing." See Ratner, Was the Supreme Court
Packed by President Grant? 50 Pol. Sci. Q. 343, 351 (1935). But cf. Fairman, Mr. Justice
Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 H.Av. L. REv.
977, 1128 (1941).
119 Baker, supra note 77, at 492-93.
120 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) ; 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
121 Baker, sura note 77, at 493-94.
122Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ; Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 326
U.S. 1 (1915); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
123 Baker, supra note 77, at 495 (quoting Boudin).
'
2 ' Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
I25 Baker, supra note 77, at 564.
128 Id. at 565.
-27 Id. at 565-566.
May, 19601 SUPREME COURT
President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to change the Court's orienta-
tion by naming more judges, or, as critics said, to "pack the Court," brought
on the famous 168 days in which his legislative proposal failed, but reorien-
tation was accomplished. This story, still fresh and vivid to students of
the Court, and to the observant public, needs no retelling here."
Criticism, if constructive, may be as proper as it has been plentiful. Mr.
Justice Brewer said in 1898:129
It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or
helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism.... True, many criticisms
may be, like their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of
criticisms than no criticism at all.
Mr. Justice Black has observed 13 that "[t] he assumption that respect for
the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism
wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with
perfect good taste, on all public institutions." Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in the same case,'' said, "[J] udges must be kept mindful of
their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous
stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt." Mr. Justice
Stone declared that "the only protection against unwise decisions, and even
judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment
on it."'51 2 Books by Mr. Justice Jackson11 3 and by Mr. Justice Douglas134
have themselves contained much implicit criticism. Mr. Justice Black up-
held the right to criticize his own Court, when criticism was one of the
very matters involved in whether the critic should be licensed to practice
law so that he could become an officer of the Court: 135 "Courts are not, and
should not be, immune to such criticism."
V. Thoughts in Chambers: Kinds of Criticism
Plentiful and proper as criticism of the Court has been, it is still not
merely worthwhile but highly necessary to consider the kinds of criticism
128 See ALsoP AND CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1937) ; CORWN, COURT OVER CONSTInTUTON
(1938); CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE (1947); JACKSON, THE STRUGOIE FOR JUDIcIAL
SUPREMACY (1941); LAWRENCE, NINE HONEST MEN (1936); LAWRENCE, SUPREME COURT OR
PoLIcTAL PUPPETS (1937); PEARSON, NINE OLD MEN (1936); Symosrum OF AMERIcAN
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATON, THE CONSnrUTON RECONSIDERED (Read ed. 1938).
129 15 Nat'l Corp. Rep. 848, 849 (1898), quoted in CoHN AND BorN, supra note 8, at 241.
130 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
131 Id. at 289.
132 Quoted in MASON, THE SUPREME COURT RoM TArT TO WARREN 205 (1958).
133 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
184 DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY (1954).
135 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957).
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and the nature and value of each. If, as Justice Brewer said,13 6 "all sorts
of criticism are better than no criticism at all," the beginning of wisdom is
not fear of criticism, but understanding and appraisal of the various sorts.
The essence of this process is "to see ourselves as others see us." One
cannot read the allegations, the defense, or the history without gathering at
once what anyone with gumption knows-that lawyers are advocates by
profession, training, and developed predilection; that judges (state and
federal) are lawyers subject to the same advocacy habit and way of
thought; and that the prosecutors and defenders on the allegations here
have (perhaps necessarily) taken adversary positions. And if real illumi-
nation of the Supreme Court's role and function is to be gained, one must
consider the advocates but also look to those studying the Court, its work,
and its products, as an institution-that is, one must look to the law
professors and political scientists. They represent no special interests and
have the great advantage of detachment. While even they find it difficult
to catalog all the types of criticism, a detached analysis might show that
certain types stand out.
(Criticism primarily on form, viewed favorably as purism or unfavor-
ably as pettifoggery, seems more concerned with how the bat is gripped
than with who gets hit or why, and is not considered here.)
1. Libel, slander, diatribe and tirade are, of course, a category by them-
selves. But they may be considered as ranting or catcalls outside the court-
house, inadmissible in evidence, improper as argument, and valueless in
determining the merits of the case.
2. Something similar, couched in more professional terms, may, how-
ever, slip into the testimony or argument. One political scientist has help-
fully listed 3 7 what he calls the clich6s of commentary: "Independence of
the judiciary," "follows the election returns," "continuous constitutional
convention," "authoritative faculty in economics," "judicial oligarchy,"
"defender of vested rights," "destroyer of vested rights," "custodian of
enduring values," "citadel of privilege." These, he says,138 are "not only
available and traditionally approved, but can be used ... 'with all the sin-
cerity and assurance that honest partisanship can confer on pious fraud.'
3. Defense of a position against the Supreme Court's view may be
another type. When state chief justices or lower court federal judges
criticize the high Court, it is important to realize that it is their opinions
that the Supreme Court is overturning when it reverses or remands. Even
detached judges may take pride in their work, and intellectual pride is a
136 Op. dt. supra note 129.
'7 Cahill, "The Supreme Court-Friends and Foes," address, American Political Science
Association, St. Louis, Mo., Sept., 1958, draft, p. 2.
138 Ibid.
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very tender thing. A lower court judge's defense of his position and reliance
on the weight of authority among other lower courts, against the Supreme
Court's reversal of his decision, is of course nothing new. Justice Holmes
himself indulged it when he was on the Massachusetts court.139 The lower
court judges claiming the weight of authority may deplore an opinion of
the Supreme Court which takes the opposite view. And criticism of the
courts, coming from lawyers whose views before the Court have not pre-
vailed 140 may warrant the same type of consideration.
4. Criticism based solely on the results of decisions may lead to obvious
inconsistencies. When the Court, impelled by what it considered the re-
quired constitutional interpretation, was ruling against state and federal
governments (on behalf of business and conservative social and economic
interests), leaders of the bar were outspoken in the Court's defense.'
When the Court, impelled by what it considered the required constitutional
interpretation, was ruling against state and federal governments (on behalf
of the individual and liberal social and economic interests), leaders of the
bar had become outspoken in the Court's criticism. 42
In 1936 and 1937 David Lawrence, for instance, wrote two books13
defending the Supreme Court, then conservative, as "Nine Honest Men;"
yet today he is one of the Court's outstanding critics. Brent Bozell, of the
conservative National Review, another who changed his mind since 1937,
defended such shifts in position as follows:'"
The Supreme Court, before Roosevelt tried to pack it, was insisting on
strict adherence to the Constitution. Most of us opposed political efforts
to compel the Court to deviate from the Constitution. Today, however,
the Supreme Court is violating the Constitution in case after case.
The other side of the coin is apparent in the shift of liberals who criti-
cized the Court when it was conservative and defended it when it was
more liberal. 14 5
A perceptive reading of the allegations and the defense permits the
conclusion that both are based primarily on the result in the particular
cases involved. In terms of the result, the conservative and liberal minds
have met head on. The signposts lead only to the right or to the left. And
139 1 HoL-Es-PoLLocx LETTERS 40 (Howe ed. 1941).
140 Ross Malone, A.B.A. President during the House of Delegates Action, had, as a member
of the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, seconded the motion denying Schware's permis-
sion to take the bar examination. See Schware v. New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,235 (1957).
'4' See 23 A.B.A.J., 233-363 (April, May, 1937).
14 2 Supra notes 17-18.
1 43 LAWRENcE, Nn-E HoNEST MEN (1936), and SuiRExE COURT OR PomicAi PUPpETS?
(1937).
144 Quoted in CA=eL, op. cit. supra note 137, at 3.
145 See CoHN AND BoLu, op. cit. supra note 8, at 251-55.
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the road ahead to enlightenment (not to say to a unified and rational
America) is blocked by intractibility and intransigeance.
5. Criticism or evaluation of criticism based on the role and function
of the Court is more enlightening.
The first step toward enlightenment is realism. The literature of the
law is almost endless, and catalogued to the full extent that technical
expertise, word and phrase mongering, and high-priced digests and annota-
tions can accomplish. Precedent for almost anything can be found. 46 And
realism requires the clear understanding that judges in making a choice of
precedents are exercising value judgments? 47 There was far more than
mere amusement in the recent clowning of Professor Karl Llewellyn, when
he said: 14
Do you want to know how to construe statutes? I'll tell you how to con-
strue statutes. "Every statute in derogation of the common law is to be
strictly construed." Right? Right. "Every remedial statute is to be liberally
construed." Right? Right. But, every statute in derogation of the common
law is remedial; every remedial statute is in derogation of the common
law. How do you construe statutes? (With arms flung out wide and fingers
pointing to the two opposite walls of the hall): That way.
How the choice of precedents is to be made is vastly important. The
"four-square" theory or approach, by which the court has "only one duty--
to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former,"' 49 has been challenged'" as "a serious misrepresentation of the
nature of the judicial process [because] constitutional interpretation is
much more complicated" than this. The Constitution on its face is com-
posed only of words-and words have many meanings.
a. Meaning can be derived from "the intent of the framers"; but the
framers of the Constitution were a heteregeneous lot, and this approach
may achieve little more than the intent of the opinion writer.' 5 '
b. Meaning can be derived from definitions of words as used at the
time of the Constitution's original draft; but this involves some doing,
and implies a new historical dictionary.
Perhaps the most serious objection to both methods, however, is the extent
to which they propose to make a nation the prisoner of its past, and reject
34 6 ComMwG , The Higher Law, in THE CoNsTnuTioN RECONSIDERED 233 (Read ed. 1938).
1 4 7 See Frankfurter, Supreme Court in XIV ENCYCLOPEDrA Op Tm Socin SCIENCES 474,
480 (1935).
148 Lecture, University of Illinois College of Law, Dec. 10, 1959, heard personally by the
writer.
149 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
1 50Pritchett, The Supreme Court Today, 3 S.D. L. REv. 51, 54 (Spring, 1958).
151 Id. at 55, 56.
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any method of constitutional development save constitutional amendment.
Both reject the legitimacy of amendment by consensus or usage. Both
deny the possibility that evolution in moral standards or political ideology
can be given effect in the Constitution without changing its language.
152
After all, said Marshall,' the Constitution was "intended to endure for
ages to come and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."
c. So, meaning can be derived by a process "which gives to the words
of the Constitution their current meaning."
The American constitutional system has given the Supreme Court the
responsibility of acting as a kind of national conscience. This function calls
for something more than historical analysis or application of judicial
precedents. It calls for a creative awareness of the values and the problems
of the times in which we live. 5 4
That is to say, "the various crises of human affairs" today, just as well as
in Marshall's time.
The second step is to realize that the actions of courts are a part of the
governmental and political process. Charles Warren, Charles Beard, Louis
Boudin, Robert Jackson and many others have made this abundantly clear.
Of course, most political scientists and legal scholars do not believe that
"the law" is an external objective phenomenon that controls judges. The
traditional explanations of judicial behavior are no longer in good standing
among sophisticates. Yet judges will not admit to judicial legislation and
the official explanation of public men and practicing lawyers is that the law
is independent of the judge and controls his behavior. This explanation is
ideological, not theoretical, and although it affects conduct, it does not
describe the behavior of public men, practicing lawyers, or deciding judges.
... Whether the judge speaks for an interest supported by the entire com-
munity or for an interest supported by a small portion, it is necessary to
describe his activity as participation in the group struggle. 55
To recognize that judges represent values and make choices is not to
recognize that they are free to choose as they want. But then neither are
legislators free. Both judges and legislators are required by the community
to behave in certain ways. Both are required to explain their conduct and
justify it in terms of some long-range considerations other than personal
preferences. 5 6
The third step is to realize that the judicial role or function regarding
legislation is a limited one. While a court may invalidate statutes, it cannot
substitute: it can say a law violates the Constitution and is to have no
152 Id. at 57.
153 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
154 Pritchett, supra note 150, at 62-63.
15 5 PELTASoN, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1955).
156 Id., at 5.
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effect, but it cannot say (except for the Constitution, which it did not enact)
what any other law should be. To the extent its holding may revitalize the
common law, even this is not legislating-the common law was always
judicial. And a court's bar against a statute no more enacts law than an
executive's veto. "Toc many people... [have] said too often that judges
not only do but must legislate."'15 7 In any sense that the function appears
legislative, it is strictly a negative sense.'5 8
The fourth step is to realize that the Court's role and function are
necessary and vital. "The plain fact is that the Constitution does not
interpret itself and history, more than logic, has confided much of that
function in the Supreme Court of the United States."'' 59 The Court must
act. And the high place of the Court, the written, permanent, and public
aspect of its pronouncements, and the nature of precedent and interpreta-
tion require that it act with care. As Justice Jackson has said, if the Court
reviews and approves an incident, "that passing incident becomes the
doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own,
and all that it creates will be in its own image."'610
The fifth step is to consider who but the Court is to interpret the Con-
stitution. "It is not necessary to prove that the Supreme Court never made
a mistake; but if the power is to be taken away from them it is necessary
to prove that those who are to exercise it would be likely to make fewer
mistakes."' 6" If the silent Calvin Coolidge had said nothing else, these
words alone may show that reticence engenders responsibility. If we are
stuck with the Court and the doctrine of judicial review, it is yet to be
shown that some other process would be better.
These steps assure us that in constitutional interpretation, as in many
other things, we passed the age of innocence long ago. But we can know of
the Kinsey Report without adopting it as a guide: we still have the Bible,
Dante, Shakespeare, Frost, and many other wonderful things. We still have
the Constitution. Since we are beyond innocence, we should be mature. And
maturity involves not an avoidance of value judgments, but consideration
of how to make them and when.
Maturity, then, is the last step. Marshall in the past, and Pritchett
today, suggest that maturity requires current construction in terms of
current meanings. Mearns says, 6' "It is not a problem of whether the mem-
157 Cahill, op. cit. supra note 137, at 19.
158 See cogent examples of the Supreme Court's view swept aside on such issues as slavery,
legal tender, income tax, anti-trust regulation, intergovernmental immunities, and child labor,
in PLTASON, op. cit. supra note 155, at 63.
159 Cahill, op. cit. supra note 137, at 19.
l60 Korematsu v. U.S. 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1945).
161 Coolidge, quoted in WAmmzr, CO ,GEss, TE CoNsnrrur oN AMD THE SupamaE COURT
174 (1936).
162 Mearns, Checkreins Upon Government, 44 VA. L. REv. 1117, 1127 (1958).
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bers of the Court should be active or restrained, but the more difficult one
of when it can safely exercise that self-restraint. Midst the increasing
dynamism of government, with its increased effort to bring about the
good life through legislative action, there will be a corresponding increase
in the occasions where civil liberties will be endangered and the processes
of democracy opened to legislative infringements." The good life (as law-
makers see it) and civil liberties (for even odd minorities) are both impor-
tant, of course. But Mearns implies strongly that court protection against
legislative action, vital to the American economy when business was
burgeoning and people could move West, is equally vital to individual
liberty today, when business and government are big, and people can move
nowhere. "What," he asks,"' "is a Court which truly believes in the
principles of a free and open society, legitimately to do to further these
principles?"
Mr. Justice Douglas has one answer: Follow the Constitution, in cur-
rent meaning. That is, of course, a highly general value judgment, but no
more so than those exercised during-for conservatives-the "good old
days" when the Supreme Court was invoking the Constitution against
business regulatory statutes.' And it explains his position on the side of
the libertarians: Judges are not sworn to uphold statutes. "Any American
court is supposed to be pro-First Amendment, pro-Fourth Amendment,
pro-Fifth Amendment, pro-Fourteenth Amendment, and so on, for it is the
Constitution the judges are sworn to defend.' 65
While we are concerned here only with criticism of the Court, we
should in passing make a distinction which is today quite important.
To criticize the Court or call its decisions wrong is an exercise of free
speech. To seek changes in the declared law through constitutional processes
is an intrinsic civil right. To talk of revolution is historic and, in the
abstract, permissible.
But: To say that the Court's decisions are not the law of the land is to
counsel virtual anarchy. To interpose against them invalid local arrange-
163 Ibid.
164 See note 122, supra. Conservative critics who favored decisions invalidating state social
and economic legislation and deplored the later trend to sustain similar Congressional legisla-
tion might refer to Holmes: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states." Collected Legal Papers,
295-96 (1921). Is this view not cogent today?
165 On Misconception of the Judicial Function and the Responsibility of the Bar, 59 COL.
L. REv. 227 (Feb. 1959). The "overriding responsibility of this Court is to the Constitution.
... The proponent before the Court is not the petitioner but the Constitution of the United
States." Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165 (1957), opinion by Mr. justice Harlan.
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ments (backed by state troops, or not) is to approach nullification. To set
up or sanction state or federal police or administrative improprieties or
trial irregularities in defiance of the declared law is perverse. To incite or
commit unprovoked violence to thwart decrees may be contempt, disorder
or rebellion-at least as grave as a lecture on world peace.
These fruits of criticism we must pass, however, and get back to the
case against the Court.
VI. The Evidence Submitted
With the allegations and defense dearly stated, with the precedents
before us, with some criteria for evaluating criticism, what does the evi-
dence show? Has the Supreme Court really ruled unwisely, immorally,
unconstitutionally? Has it really been a danger to democracy? Has it
lacked judicial self-restraint? Has it really weakened security? Has it been
guilty of any lust for power, instability, usurpation, socialist doctrines,
novel interpretations hanstringing the government? Is it really "against
America"? Should it be curbed?
Partisan answers to these questions may be inevitable. Each side claims
reliance on the Constitution, rationalizes its own view and scoffs at the
other's: understood major premises and a common frame of reference are
unavailable. In such a case, attempts to say which side is right may have
little effect-in the court of public opinion readers are jurymen, not liti-
gants; and no writer has jurisdiction over minds.
Still we can, and must review the evidence-both that already sub-
mitted and the new evidence appearing since the allegations. This, of course,
consists first of the decisions'06 alleged to be so bad for the country.
Brown simply took the Constitution at its word: 167
No state shall make or enforce any law [which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens...] nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.... Education is perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments [,] ... the very foundation
of good citizenship [,J ... a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment [,J . .. a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.... To separate them...
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.... Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding [of one of the courts below] is rejected.... [Though tangible
facilities be considered equal,] separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.
260 Volume-page citations appear supra note 2. Hereinafter cited by short form.
167 347 U.S. 483, 493-495 (1954).
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The holding was of course directly in line with a long-growing trend,
and eminent Southern legal scholars had all but predicted the decision.'
Of course, too, change was inevitable for the South. But there had been
great change before-slavery and secession, independence and defeat,
emancipation and reconstruction, redemption and reunion, white home rule
under the Klan and Jim Crow and Plessy, and gradualism under the later
cases.
If the essence of education is its effect on the mind, the case simply
showed that equal protection meant literally that-including protection
from a state-enforced inferiority complex for an entire race; this was almost
literal interpretation. And if the Constitution was and is "intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs," the current meaning and interpretation had to be
not that of Plessy, viewing equality as physical only for late chattels, but
of today viewing all persons as free human souls-complete with psycho-
logical considerations.
In Nelson, a conviction under a state statute for an alleged offense
involving federal subversion, was reversed by the state's own court (the
high Court merely affirming that reversal) because: Congress having pre-
empted the field, "such prosecutions should be exclusively within the con-
trol of the Federal Government." As J. Edgar Hoover has said, the inter-
vention of local superstructures "cannot be if our internal security is to be
best served";' the state procedure and punishment were different from
the federal, making possible "incompatible or conflicting jurisdictions";
and "a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go
farther than Congress has seen fit to go."' ° So much for the conflicting
government interests. Considering civil liberties, did federal or state
security really require or warrant supplementary state laws, possibly un-
leashing "politicians in thousands of counties" for enterprises based on
"outcries of communism"? 1 71 Or was American security today inherently
a federal matter in which "the federal government is taking good care of
itself"? 1
72
In Slochower the accused had already told of his past Communist party
membership, and city authorities knew of this. Neither he nor they knew
that (further) refusal to answer investigative queries would result in auto-
matic discharge. He had 27 years college teaching experience and tenure
by state law. The Court said he must comply with reasonable, nondiscrimi-
168 Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HA{v. L. REv. 377 (1954).
169 Quoted 350 U.S. 497, 507 (1956).
170 Id. at 504.
171 Report of Executive Board, 19 LAW. GuiLD RV. 30 (Spring 1959).
172 A.B.A. Bill of Rights Committee Report, committee draft, p. 5.
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natory employment terms, but the privilege against self-incrimination
(V-XIV) barred discharge under a law "patently arbitrary and discrimi-
natory" because it inferred some guilt or academic unfitness from mere
silence. If the holding remanding the cause was a moral victory, it was also
Pyrrhic: on call for rehearing, he resigned. 73 Background query: should
or should not a good college teacher be barred because he is an ex-com-
munist? Chief query: Should guilt be inferred from silence? Fact query:
Was state power or security weakened by this holding?
In Schware, a poor but intelligent and socially sensitive New York
immigrant boy had taken an Italian alias to avoid anti-Semitic prejudice;
he had joined the Communist party but resigned in disgust at the Nazi-
Soviet pact; he had been arrested but never convicted. He served honorably
as a World War II paratrooper, worked his way through law school with
good marks and exemplary conduct, and disclosed all his background. His
good character was proved by students, professors, businessmen and a
rabbi, his patriotism and religion by acts and correspondence. The Court
said that the self-protecting innocent alias was not wrongful, that ex-
communism did not imply present bad character, that arrest without con-
viction meant nothing (failure to press charges even perhaps implying
innocence): hence New Mexico must permit him to take the bar examina-
tion. Query: which are more important in a lawyer-intelligence, social
sensitivity, the social courage to join an unpopular cause and the gump-
tion and guts to quit it; or pure, unsullied (untried and uncommitted)
conformity?
In Konigsberg, an Austrian immigrant taught history and literature,
won a master's degree, worked for state government agencies, and served
through the E.T.O. ultimately as a captain, and chief orientation officer
for the entire Seventh Army, explaining inter alia the advantages of
democracy over totalitarianism. His California law school record was good
and 42 witnesses (priest, rabbi, lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and social
workers) attested his good character. But: he had written editorials criti-
cizing the Korean War, big business, the California Tenney committee on
subversion, and Dennis. And he refused to say whether he had been a
member of the Communist party. He said categorically "I do not [advocate
unlawful overthrow of the government], I never did or never will.' 1 74 This
was undisputed, and one of his editorials condemning such advocacy sup-
ported his testimony. He categorically denied being a communist philo-
173Id. at 10. Cf. Beilan v. Board, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958), holding that state authorities on proper proceedings may discharge employees for
refusing to answer official inquiry as to communist group or party membership. Beilan was a
Philadelphia public school teacher, Lerner a New York subway conductor.
174 353 U.S. 252, 271 (1957).
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sophically, but said the Party was legal in California and what party he
belonged to was none of the bar committee's business. His alleged attend-
ance at a communist meeting was unproved. Holding his good moral char-
acter and non-advocacy of revolution were proved and not discredited by
his editorial writings or refusal to answer as to the party, the Court held
him eligible for a license to practice law: "A lifetime of good citizenship
is worth very little if it is so frail that it cannot withstand the suspicions
which were apparently the basis for the Committee's action."'175
Of the two cases, the A.B.A. Bill of Rights Committee said: '" "weaken-
ing of national security by these decisions is hard to perceive."
In Sweezy the accused said he had never been a communist nor advo-
cated overthrow of the government nor been in any such movement. He
would not answer questions about the Progressive party, his wife's con-
nection with that or with communists, his lectures on socialism, his possible
advocacy of Marxism or his political opinions or beliefs-all on grounds
the questions were not pertinent to a subversion inquiry, and that they
violated the first amendment. On contempt conviction below he was ordered
to jail until he answered. The Court said,177 "[T]here unquestionably was
an invasion of [his] liberties in ... academic freedom and political expres-
sion-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread."
The A.B.A. Bill of Rights Committee found17 "no demonstration that the
Supreme Court, in weighing as it has the individual immunities of the
persons questioned and the public interests of the states, has impaired the
national security or that of the states."
Raley simply said that, when a state commission advised witnesses that
they could rely on the (Ohio) constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation but did not tell them about an immunity statute which vitiated the
privilege, answer refusals rendered unlawful by the immunity statute were
the result of virtual entrapment and could not support convictions for
contempt.
Moore was the case of a seventeen year old negro of limited education
and mentality, who was told by a Kalamazoo sheriff in effect that possible
mob violence was imminent, and that if he was guilty he might so plead
and "might better be getting away before trouble." In such a case his waiver
of the right to counsel regarding degrees of murder and questions beyond
his comprehension was considered not intelligently made and, hence, of no
effect. The meat of the decision is the sheriff's virtual inducement of the
plea by the fear planted in the defendant's mind.
175Id. at 273-74.
176 Op. cit. supra note 172, p. 13.
177 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
178 Op. cit. supra note 172, at 22. Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1958), contempt
conviction affirmed where academic freedom and political expression were not so closely knit.
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In Griffin, where a prompt petition was filed establishing trial defects
meriting reversal, but unavailable on appeal because the defendant was
too poor to buy a stenographic report of the trial-alleging a denial of
equal protection-it was held that "there can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Desti-
tute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defend-
ants who have money enough to buy transcripts.".71' This is new law, and
there may be convicts "in numbers unknown to us"""0 who might seek
relief under it; but appellate reforms and sensible, economic modes for
securing review may be used so that "the State will neither bolt the door to
equal justice nor support a wasteful abuse of the appellate process."""
In Eskridge, the same rule was applied under a Washington statute
providing for a free transcript if in the trial judge's opinion "justice will
thereby be promoted." On a petition for transcript alleging substantial trial
errors, the trial judge (sic) found the defendant had had "a fair and
impartial trial." The state supreme court denied his mandamus request and
struck his appeal because he had not filed a transcript. A federal court
denied habeas corpus. On review, the Court followed Griffin even though
the Eskridge conviction had been in 1935.
In Lambert, the Court recognized that ignorance of the law is no excuse
in many cases and that the police power gave broad latitude to declare
offenses exclusive of knowledge. But under a unique city ordinance based
on mere presence in the city requiring convicted felons to register (giving
police a convenient list of suspects), either proved knowledge or an oppor-
tunity to register after being informed were in effect required before con-
viction. Though the defendant had been convicted in the same city and
lived there seven years before the nonregistration offense, there was no
proof of knowledge of the law. Distinguishing laws such as those requiring
registration for a draft or to drive a car (incumbent on most citizens),
the court viewed this registration law imposed on a special few as one
"which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community," a law "too severe for that community to bear,"
hence violating due process.8 2
In Ctmmunist Party, the Subversive Activities Control Board's finding
that the Party was subversive was based largely on testimony of persons
suspected of perjury-Matusow, Crouch and Johnson. This covered 668
pages of the transcript, and was cited 85 times by the Board. The govern-
ment refused to stipulate for striking it, and all the Court did was to send
179 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
180 Concurring opinion, 351 U.S. 20, 25 (1956).
181 Id. at 24.
182355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957), quoting HoLuns, THx CoMMoN LAw (1881).
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the case back for hearing on whether it should be stricken or discounted.
The Court "cannot pass upon a record containing such challenged testi-
mony," and the holding was simply "because the fair administration of
justice requires it."'83 The delay was considered "regrettable" but the
Board's finding even when finally approved would simply "make one more
formal record of what every educable American must already know": "the
malign character of the Communist Party."18 With an effect at best
redundant, delay was considered a small price for a high judicial standard
making "certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest that only
irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted."185
Yates involved point of view. In security terms alone, any talk of revo-
lution, any organizational work for a revolutionary party is bad and Smith
Act prosecutions are good; decisions limiting such prosecutions make a
shambles of the act and weaken security; to permit prosecution only when
the talk urges action, and not when teaching even with evil intent is
divorced from action, is a "gossamer fine distinction." It would follow that
the historic distinction between talk and incitement is obsolete, and that an
abatement of Smith Act prosecutions after Yates was a weakening of secu-
rity caused by Yates. It would follow too that an act to ban such talk and
organization of (=for?) any such party ought to be liberally construed to
achieve the remedy; and the "organizing" condemned would not be limited
to that of original party formation in 1945, barred by the statute of limita-
tions, but would include current recruitment. And on these terms, if Yates
was an improper call of foul against the varsity team, weakening security
in national efforts, then Nelson was a bad call against the freshmen, imped-
ing the state team. For on these terms88 the job is too big for the mere
nation, and states can and ought to help, because there "aren't enough
people to do the work."
Argument with confirmed exponents of such a view is fruitless: every
premise is their own; every inference is tenable; and only a slip exposes
such extremism-when, e.g., they criticize a 1956 decision for not citing a
1957 work.1
87
But other premises are possible. The security of the United States and
free American institutions include free speech. This is secured by the first
amendment. While speech inciting to revolution with a "clear and present
danger" that the action urged may be carried out is unlawful and unpro-
183 351 U.S. 115, 125 (1956).
184 op. cit. supra note 172, at 8.
185 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956).
186 See these views ably stated in Cohn and Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A.
Report and Resolutions, 28 FORDHAm L. REV. 233, 284 (Summer 1959).
187 Slochower (1956) is criticized by Cohn and Bolan because the opinion "ignored"
Hoox, CoMMoN SENSE AND THE F=FTi AMENDMENT (1957). Id. at 262 n. 196.
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tected by the first amendment, such speech "divorced from action," even
though uttered with evil intent, is protected by the first amendment.
Though a statute to make unlawful such speech directing clear and present
action is valid, its application to a case where the speech does not direct
clear and present action is not. A jury given this distinction could find
the defendant guilty-but a guilty verdict by a jury not instructed to keep
the distinction in mind must be set aside. 88
The distinction is not only historic; it is valid and vital. Lacking it,
witness what can happen. Any speech advocating violent overthrow of the
government is unlawful. The Supreme Court is part of our government.
"Outside of the courtroom, certain inferences not only may, but logically
must, be drawn.. . ." Talk that the Court "has frequently ignored precedent
and employed fallacious reasoning,' 89 even though divorced from action to
overthrow the Court, involves an inference that the Court ought to be
overthrown. "Who is capable of drawing the fine distinction between the
state of mind of one who teaches the commission of a crime as a mere
'abstract principle'.., and the state of mind of one who ... instigates its
commission?"'19 On such reasoning does Roy Cohn's quite scholarly article
advocate overthrow of the Court, hence (part of) the government, in viola-
tion of the Smith Act?
Those believing in the first amendment, honoring the Court for its pro-
tection of liberties preserved by the first amendment, and feeling no over-
weenlng need for legislation construable as infringing it have found no
weakening of security in any of the three key subversion cases. As decided,
none of the three involved the invalidity of any statute. The first involved
evidence and procedure; the other two statutory construction. If there is
complaint about Communist Party, the critics might urge the government
to get better evidence than perjury when it wants a political party to register
its own subversion. If there is complaint about Nelson, they might ask
Congress to draft a statute expressly authorizing states to act regarding
national as well as state subversion. Their quarrel should be with Congress,
not with the Court. If the complaint is about Yates, and if Congress cannot
draft a constitutional statute to condemn speech apart from action, their
quarrel is with the first amendment.
Cole involved a statute authorizing the President to extend the 1950
Security Act to such departments not as he may "deem necessary" but as
he may "deem necessary in the best interests of national security."'191 A
food inspector in the New York office of the Health-Education-Welfare
Department held a nonsensitive job not involving national security. The
188 Basically, this is Yates.
1 89 CoN AN BoLA, op. cit. supra note 186, at 255, 261. Emphasis is added.
19D Id. at 266, from National Review, March 15, 1958, quoting from Am. J. op PsycxmTRy.
191 351 U.S. 536, 542 (1956). Emphasis is added.
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security power is essentially that of Congress; delegations of power are
strictly construed; the executive's discretion is viewed jealously; and what
extension was in the best interests of national security was a question of
fact, not of the President's uncontrolled discretion-just as another Presi-
dent's seizure of the steel mills when American boys were dying in Korea
was a question of fact and power, not uncontrolled discretion. Thus Cole
could not be fired under the 1950 act as extended, and retained his veteran's
preference.
Service likewise involved a statute and regulations and procedure. After
security clearances in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1949, and 1950 and post-audit
approval by the State Department head, the case was closed under the
regulations-there being no appeal to the Loyalty Board except by the
employee, from a finding adverse to him. Nonetheless, the Board acted and
found not disloyalty but reasonable doubt. The Secretary, under an appro-
priation rider saying he might "in his absolute discretion terminate ...
whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States,"'92 fired Service. Though department rules
required that a decision be made after considering the complete file, argu-
ments, briefs and testimony-the Secretary consulted none of these. The
case may mean that an appropriation rider does not supersede department
procedures; that summary discharge without following the rules is pre-
cluded. In substance it may imply that the country's interests may rest on
department morale free from fear of arbitrary discharge as much as they
rest on a department head's untrammeled power. At any rate, "how the
national security would have been weakened by following departmental
regulations does not appear."' 93
In Watkins the accused told a House un-American activities inquiry that
though he had in UAW union work cooperated with communists and taken
part in their activities so that "some persons may honestly believe that [he]
was a member of the party," he had never been a card-carrying member of
the party, had never accepted discipline and had fought them so bitterly
for compliance with the Taft-Hartley Act that further cooperation became
impossible. He said that the distinction between his frank admission of
voluntary cooperation and his clear denial of membership was made from
no other motive than "the simple fact that it is the truth." Still it was im-
portant to him. For as others might well have honestly (but wrongly)
believed him a party member, so he considered he too might be mistaken
about others. So he said he would answer any questions about himself, or
about persons he knew to be Communist party members and believed still
were. He refused answers about other past associates, about persons who
192354 U.S. 363, 374 (1957). Emphasis is added. Cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
193 Op. cit. supra note 172 at 9.
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may have been Communist party members or otherwise engaged in party
activity but to his "best knowledge and belief have long since removed
themselves from the communist movement." His refusal was based not on
the fifth amendment, but on his belief that such questions were not rele-
vant to the committee's work, and that the committee had no right to make
public exposure of such persons.
The Court noted Congress' broad power to investigate regarding the
social, economic or political background of existing statutes or of needed
statutes; its lack of power to expose private affairs for law enforcement
purposes (executive), or for resolving individual cases (judicial), or for
aggrandizing the investigators, or for punishing those investigated, or for
any other purpose unrelated to legislative functions. It noted the duty of
individuals to testify when questions were within the congressional province
-but it also noted their protections against self-incrimination, unlawful
search and seizure, and abridgement of speech, press, religion or political
belief and association.
With these guides the Court traced the history of contempt and said
simply that "un-American" meant nothing, that the committee resolution
gave no clue to the pertinence of questions, and that the chairman's remarks
to Watkins gave no further clue on which to determine the pertinence of
the question. "Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled
to make such a determination with so little guidance." Hence Watkins
simply got the benefit of the doubt and his refusal was not contemptuous.
(A dissent treated his refusal as invoking the constitutional privilege of
others he was protecting-which only they could do.) As the A.B.A. Bill
of Rights Committee explained, all the case requires is an explanation of
pertinency "of sufficient clarity to comply with the due process clause."'1 94
Any quarrel about the case on this analysis would be with Congress or
Congressmen handling investigations-not with the Court.
What strikes one as the most poignant aspect of the case is the dramatic
showing of how in such investigations witnesses can honestly-but mis-
takenly-ruin other people's lives, and how one witness (subject by past
actions to undue inference) would not himself be a party to inferring guilt
from associations.
(Sweezy, of course, was Watkins at the state level.)
Sacker, Flaxer, and the Yates sequel cases, while reflecting the temper
of the Court, were merely evidentiary or procedural refinements.
In Sacker, when a Senate Judiciary Internal Security subcommittee
was investigating the recanting of former witnesses, there arose the subject
of legislation to bar communists from federal practice-a subject outside
1 9 4 Id. at 18.
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the scope of the committee's inquiry. Sacher's refusal to answer questions
regarding his past or present membership in the party or its lawyer section
was held proper and his contempt conviction was reversed under Watkins;
and when the court of appeals again affirmed, the Supreme Court directed
dismissal of this indictment.
Flaxer, a union official, was asked October 5, 1951, if he could produce
certain records. He said a list of members could be compiled within a week,
that the information was available to him, and that he had not produced
it or the records. 94a
Arens: Will you produce it pursuant to the order of the chairman of this
session within 10 days from today?
Flaxer: I will have to take that under consideration.
Senator Watkins: That is the order, and of course we will have to take
whatever steps are necessary if at the end of the time you have not pro-
duced them.
Though he might have been excused on the ground that there was no such
list yet compiled, and that the committee had given him another ten days,
he was indicted for contempt as of October 5. Reversing the conviction,
without dissent, the Court held:' 95 "We cannot say that petitioner could
tell with a reasonable degree of certainty that the Committee demanded
the lists this very day, not 10 days hence."
The Yates sequel cases merely said that, in one trial, the refusal to
answer eleven questions was one contempt-not eleven; and, on review
again, the Court allowed the contemnor the time she had already served.
Jencks was more far-sweeping. In a criminal prosecution for filing a
false non-communist affidavit, a witness testified to certain conversations
with Jencks, but said he could not remember what he had put in his written
reports to the FBI about those conversations. It was held that for cross-
examination Jencks was entitled to see those reports to decide whether to
use them for his defense. A prior inconsistent statement of a witness is tradi-
tionally a basis for impeaching him, i.e., showing that he had said out of
court something different from what he says now in court, and that hence
he may be lying or remembering badly now; hence his testimony is (at
least) less worthy of belief than it would be without this impeachment.
Said the Court: 9 "Requiring the accused first to show conflict between
the reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused evidence
relevant and material to his defense .... Because only the defense is ade-
quately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting
the Government's witness .... [T]he defense must initially be entitled to
194a 358 U.S. 147, 149 (1958).
195 Id. at 151.
196 353 U.S. 657, 667-69 (1957).
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see them [the reports] to determine what use may be made of them. Justice
requires no less." Conceding the value of protecting confidential govern-
ment documents, the court quoted Judge Learned Hand that "prosecution
necessarily ends any confidential character. . . . The government must
choose; either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which
a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully."'19
A Clark dissent said that unless Congress changed the rule, "... those
intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may
as well close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal
and thus afforded him a Roman holiday for rummaging through confiden-
tial information as well as vital national secrets."'19
A statute passed after the decision virtually adopted the majority
ruling.198
a
In Kent and Dayton passport refusals were set aside because the State
Department had been given no statutory criteria on which to exercise the
refusal power. Traditionally, passports had been highly valuable as extra-
legal "courtesy cards" evidencing citizenship and honored by protection
in friendly nations. They were not required for exit or entry until 1952.
Since then they have been required for both. The right to travel is (con-
cededly in the case) a part of "liberty" not to be lost without due process
of law; and war measures were not involved. Rockwell Kent and Walter
Briehl refused to sign non-communist affidavits when they sought passports.
Kent was refused because of alleged communist adherence and writing
(evidenced by a book he had written), Briehl because of connection with
alleged communist causes. The Court said these associations (not crimes)
and the refusal to respond to inquiry into their beliefs were no basis for
refusal to issue passports. Even if passport issue were discretionary, such a
discretion had not been granted by Congress, said the Court, avoiding a
decision on constitutionality of the statute and treating the refusal orders
as violations of the fifth amendment as applied. Dayton, who denied com-
munism past or present and most subversive connections, was refused on
the basis of a file (kept confidential from him) supposedly connecting him
with the Rosenberg spy ring. Treating this as association at most, the Court
followed Kent.
What national harm could come from letting Rockwell Kent attend
the phoney Helsinki "Peace" Conference (and so expose himself further
as a dupe or sputnik) does not appear. The harm to individuals from an
uncontrolled department power to restrict the right to travel did appear,
to the Court. Whether a statute granting that power to be exercised on the
197 1d. at 671.
198a 18 U.S.C. 3500 (1957). And see Senate Judiciary committee report, 1957 US. Code
Congr. and Adm. News, p. 1861, at 1862.
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basis of political beliefs or associations would be valid was not reached.
If the statute which was construed was not explicit enough, it was written
by Congress-not by the Court.
In Bonetti the accused was ordered deported under a 1918 Anarchist
act amended in 1950, which provided for deportation of any alien who had
been "after entering the United States, a member of the Communist party."
He had entered the United States in 1923, thereafter joined the Communist
party, quit in 1936 and never rejoined, and left the country in 1937,
abandoning all citizenship rights. He entered in 1938 as a quota immigrant
and had lived here since, except for one day's visit to Mexico in 1939. After
the 1938 entry he had never been a communist. What the Court in effect
said was that the 1923 entry and what transpired after that were wiped out
by the 1936 exit abandoning citizenship; that the entry involved now was
the 1938 entry-with no communist membership after that, hence no depor-
tation for that reason was possible. A substance interpretation, rather than
one merely grammatical, thus was used. The Court found this the "only
fair and reasonable construction that ... cloudy provisions will permit;"
and in any event the case was novel on its facts and not likely to recur. 9
Witkovich, an alien ordered deported, was indicted and convicted for
failing to answer the Attorney General's questions on deportation and avail-
ability for departure and "such other information, whether related or not
related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper."
The Court did not hold the statute unconstitutional, but said that "to hold
that the statute intended to give an official the unlimited right to subject a
man to criminal penalties for failure to answer absolutely any questions the
official may decide to ask would raise very serious constitutional ques-
tions."200 In other words, the first amendment covers deportees as well as
citizens. Said the Bill of Rights Committee,20 ' (if the case involved security
at all) "to the extent that there may be a danger, it is a danger flowing from
the policy of the Bill of Rights."
VII. Motion to Reconsider: Newly Discovered Evidence
Since the chief current criticisms of August 1958 one term of court has
passed and part of another. The decisions of this period must be considered
as additional evidence for use in evaluating the criticism and the critics.
Briefly, it shows that the Court has neither given way in the face of the
criticism nor taken any umbrage at it; for the late decisions as a whole
seem neither more security-minded nor more libertarian than those before
August, 1958.
199 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958).
200353 U.S. 194, 197-98 (1957).
201 Op. cit. supra note 172, at 26.
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In the segregation field, less than six weeks after the critical blasts of
1958, the Court unanimously reaffirmed Brown, and said recalcitrant state
officials could not delay rational desegregation plans by legislative devices
and state-induced "trouble. '202 Persons interested not in evasion or trouble
but sane adjustment under Brown were likewise protected against shotgun
investigations aimed at the N.A.A.C.P.20 3 And the Court's thwarting of
Alabama's attempts to stop the N.A.A.C.P. through injunction, ouster, and
a $100,000 fine for not revealing its rank and file members20 4 was pinned
down against further stubbornness by the Alabama Supreme Court.20 5 A
Negro was not bound to resist and await arrest to test his right to desegre-
gated bus service--he could test it by declaratory judgment.20 6 However,
a non-discriminatory and reasonable literacy test for voting was upheld.2 7
And new barratry laws, though directed obviously at the N.A.A.C.P., were
at least to be heard in state courts before being banned by the federal.F0 8
In the field of State due process there were strong holdings based on
individual liberties against unconstitutional state action, and equally strong
holdings for the state against individual contentions of unconstitutionality.
The right to counsel was deemed vital for a defendant who after a hung
jury mistrial was placed in solitary confinement, whose lawyer withdrew
and who had no time to get a new lawyer for the second trial, so that his
conviction there was reversed.209 A murder conviction was reversed because
based on a confession induced by duress, fatigue, and falsely induced sym-
pathy for the defendant's policeman friend (who falsely claimed he was in
trouble for knowing the defendant) .21 A robbery confession given by one
apparently insane required reversal of the resultant conviction.21' Another
such decision involving coercion was sent back to the district court so it
could examine the record-not rely on state court recitals. 21 And a con-
viction based on the evidence of a prosecution witness who had been prom-
ised consideration (and who the assistant state's attorney knew was lying
when he said he hadn't) was reversed.13 One convicted of murder who
alleged 415 constitutional errors in a sensational and widely publicized case
was held entitled to review, despite his escape pending motion for new trial
202 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
203 Scull v. Va., 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
204 N.A.A.C.P. v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
205 N.A.A.C.P. v. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1960).
206Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
2o7Lassiter v. Northampton Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
208 Harrison v. N.AA.C.P, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
209 Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
210 Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
211 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
212 jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276 (1959).
213 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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which by Indiana law might cost him review. 14 Griffin was reasserted. 15
Three double jeopardy cases went against the accused. Prior federal
court acquittal of robbing a federally insured lending agency was held no
bar to state court conviction on the same act for armed robbery. 16 State
court conviction for conspiracy in Illinois to destroy property of another
(telephone facilities in Mississippi, Tennessee and Louisiana) was held no
bar to federal conviction on the same act of agreement for conspiracy to
destroy federal communications." And when a robber seized a victim's
car at gunpoint, forced him to flee with him, shot him, and took off in the
car, a state conviction for murder (with life sentence) was no bar to state
conviction on the same facts for kidnapping (with death sentence) .21s
The prohibition against unlawful search was held no bar to conviction
for refusal to admit a rat inspector without a warrant to premises where rat
refuse lay heaped outside.219 And a similar view on refusal to admit a hous-
ing inspector was noted.2 ° The Uniform Act to secure out of state witnesses
was upheld.22 Witnesses under immunity by statute were held bound to
testify.2 2 And witnesses in a secret investigation of bar irregularities were
held bound to testify though their counsel were, except on call, excluded
from the proceedings 2
In federal due process, it was much the same. There was neither sub-
mission by the Court to the views of critics nor vindictive over-extension of
its previously stated views.
A Mann Act conviction was reversed under a common law rule that a
wife cannot testify against her husband without consent of both.2 4 Court
martial trial for civilian army employees overseas was again barred. 25 One
shot wounding two federal officers was held to be but one assault,22 and
punishment after a bank robbery conviction was held not to be aggravated
by another conviction on the same facts for receiving the proceeds. 27 Con-
spiracy to murder June 10, 1949 (almost four years after the ceasefire and
2y2 after official cessation of hostilities December 31, 1946, but before
214 Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
215 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
216 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
2 1 7 Abbate v. U.S., 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
218 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
219 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2o Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
221 New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
222 Mills v. La., 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
223 Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959).
224 Hawkins v. U.S., 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
225 Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), and companion cases.
226 Ladner v. U.S., 358 U.S. 169 (1958).
227 Heflin v. U.S., 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
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official termination of the "war"-1951 with Germany, 1952 with Japan)
was held to be "in time of peace" hence not triable by court martial.22 8 Kid-
napping, though a noncapital offense if the victim allegedly is unharmed,
may (when nothing is alleged either way regarding harm) be a capital of-
fense. Hence, a conviction of kidnapping on information, possible only for
noncapital offenses, was reversed. 229 Indictment for interfering with inter-
state sand shipments could not support conviction for interfering with
steel.230 A conviction based on arrest and-search without warrant with no
more cause than certain undisclosed information was reversed and treated
as arrest on suspicion only. 31 These were libertarian holdings.
On the other hand, the Jencks rule was carefully restricted: a confer-
ence memo considered not within the rule was denied to the defendant;2 32
when the same information sought had already been given, application
under Jencks was denied; 233 and it was held that grand jury minutes of testi-
mony could in the trial judge's discretion be denied.234 The purchase and
receiving of narcotics was held to be two offenses, not merged, and hence
subject to consecutive term sentences.235 An arrest without warrant on a
general description by a paid informer was held proper.23 6 These were con-
servative.
The same balance of interests appeared regarding civil liberties and
security.
In nonsensitive employment (cf. Cole), a dismissal was reversed be-
cause regulations were not followed and the right to cross examine was
denied; 237 the same result was reached in private employment requiring
security checks 3 8 The right to criticize the law (Smith Act) and cases
interpreting it (Dennis) was upheld against claims of impugning the court
and judge.239 Freedom of the press in questioned areas was again asserted.2 40
The right to travel was upheld for one convicted (of entering a Pacific
atom testing area) whose appeal bond had been conditioned on not leaving
U. S. jurisdiction 24
22 8 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
M9 Smith v. U.S., 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
2 3 0 Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
231 Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 99 (1959).
232 Palermo v. U.S., 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
233 Rosenberg v. U.S., 360 U.S. 367 (1959).
234 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S., 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
235 Harris v. U.S., 359 U.S. 19 (1959).
236 Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
237 Viarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
238 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
239 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
240 Kingsley Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (re LAWRENCE, LADY CinATTEny's
LOVER); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
241 Reynolds v. U.S., 267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959).
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But on a statement giving complete immunity, refusal to answer before
a grand jury supported a criminal contempt charge. 2 Time factors in immi-
gration were again related to substance rather than grammatical construc-
tion, this time against the individual (cf. Bonetti). One Tak entered law-
fully in 1951 and left; in 1952 he entered unlawfully and served from 1953
to 1955 in the armed forces. In seeking naturalization on more than 90
days service "having been lawfully admitted:" it was held that he had no
such service after the key entry involved since that one was unlawful.243
Three key decisions have kept the controversy alive and timely: In one
a congressional committee witness who refused to answer regarding his con-
nections, if any, with communism was held properly convicted when a pre-
pared memo showed he knew the pertinency of the questions to an inquiry
into subversion in education, when he expressly disclaimed reliance on the
fifth amendment, and when his claim was an attack on the Committee's
exposure for exposure's sake. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Chief
Justice Warren dissented on the ground that this was the Committee's
prime (and improper) purpose. 44
In another case a sponsor of World Fellowship, Inc., a New Hamp-
shire discussion group which had some speakers who had been connected
with allegedly subversive organizations, refused to give (not the names of
speakers, but) the names of guests. It was held that Nelson did not apply
because Congress had not occupied the whole field, that the state (with a
statutory right to inspect camp guest registers) had a right to know sub-
versives in the state, and that no question of academic or political freedom
was involved. Again there was a strong dissent'r 5 This case is still before
the courts.246
In February, 1960, the Court in recess conference continued three cases
involving the Communist party and membership in it and set them for argu-
ment October 10.247 So that, at least regarding the issue of liberty and sub-
version, the Court's reaction to criticism is still an open matter.
VIII. Jury Instructions: A Reader's Guide
A writer as "judge" in the court of public opinion cannot direct a ver-
dict. But jurymen need instructions and readers deserve a guide. Hence,
in lieu of conclusions, these "instructions. 248
242 Brown v. U.S., 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
243 Tak Shan Fong v. U.S., 359 U.S. 102 (1959).
244 Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
2 45 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
246 Concord (N.H.) Daily Monitor, April 1, 1960, p. 1.
247 One is Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956);
the others involve appeals by Junius Scales and John Francis Noto. See St. Louis Globe-
Democrat, Feb. 9, 1960, editorial.
248 Apologies to Victor Hemphill (former Illinois Circuit judge) deceased, author of
Illinois Jury Instructions.
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The instructions and this article are meant to aid, not influence. Readers
should heed both sides of the case, and the credibility of those discussing the
Court and the validity of what they say are for readers alone to judge--
for all Americans have a right to their views on American institutions. Any-
thing in this paper tending to impair the reader's task may of course be
ignored.
The issue is whether the Court has weakened American security or
has been lacking in restraint, or whether it has preserved American freedom.
If the complaint itself presented no offense against the American people,
if it was untimely, if it lacked particulars, if it was maliciously prosecuted,
or if it was unproved-you may dismiss it and exonerate the Court. If it
met these tests, you may condemn the Court.
The Court must use due care in its work, that care required of reason-
ably prudent men-given their awesome responsibilities and multifold bur-
dens, chosen for special skills but withal fallible human beings. Substantial
performance may or may not be enough. If it has willfully misused its office,
this is a grievous fault for which you may wish to write your congressman.
Likewise if it has been careless-for American government or American
individuals may be unduly harmed by judicial results, though no judge so
intended. In evaluating what the Court has done, consider that it must
decide cases, and thus has to say something.
But critics must also use due care; that care required of reasonably
prudent men concerned with public affairs but obliged to look toward the
ultimate good of their country. You may consider the wisdom of what the
critics say and whether they should have said anything, for they are not
faced with specific cases to explain and decide. If critics of high standing
have spoken for personal ends, you may abate the prosecution. If they were
used, misled, or if they directed attention to certain cases to obscure resent-
ment at others, you may weigh what that means. You may consider what
advice they had available, what they accepted or refused, what evidence
they weighed or ignored, and whether they acted in good faith. If they
acted in fear of sudden danger, you may excuse extreme positions so occa-
sioned; but you may survey the whole American scene in finding whether
such fears were warranted.
If both the Court and the critics have been willful, or if both have been
careless, you may bar the critics if their own fault helped bring on the
current crisis; or you may weigh the Court's fault with the fault of the
critics.
If the Court has been a nuisance, you must balance what harm it has
done with what good it has done. If the critics have been a nuisance, you
may not deny them the right to speak, but you may hold your ears, grimace,
or turn away.
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Neither the Court, the critics, the defenders, nor this writer can give a
guaranty to be right. But, given the problems of both government and
individual and the tests facing America today, we had all better be right
more often than not.
The critics have the burden of proof. The charges are serious. And
clear and convincing evidence should be needed to sustain them. In this
kind of case, you may consider all the evidence adduced here, and all else
the Court (and critics) have done or said. If the Court has taken flight,
this may indicate guilt; if it has stood fast, this may indicate courage-
either involves responsibility. You must heed what some Court members
have said in defense; but the silence of others is no admission of fault nor
of any agreement with critics or defenders. False or frenetic witnesses may
be ignored. You may consider custom and usage, the value of precedent,
and the desirability of progress.
Regarding damages, you may ask if America is stronger or weaker be-
cause of the Warren Court, or because of the critics. You may ask if the
Court or the critics have enhanced or impaired desirable government func-
tions, essential individual freedoms, or vital constitutional processes.
On all the evidence, and guided by these instructions-whether you
really heed them or not-you may find the Court at fault, the critics at
fault, or neither at fault. Which way you decide is exceedingly important.
The future of the American form of government may turn upon your
decision.
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